9 Best Bitcoin Mining Pools: Legit Sites (2020 Companies)

Analysis of Bitcoin Pooled Mining Reward Systems

arXiv:1112.4980
Date: 2011-12-21
Author(s): Meni Rosenfeld

Link to Paper


Abstract
In this paper we describe the various scoring systems used to calculate rewards of participants in Bitcoin pooled mining, explain the problems each were designed to solve and analyze their respective advantages and disadvantages.

Bibliography
[1] c00w. bithopper: Python pool hopper proxy. http://bitcointalk.org/?topic=26866.
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[5] slush. Bitcoin pooled mining. http://mining.bitcoin.cz/.
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Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies

arXiv:1901.06830
Date: 2019-01-21
Author(s): Soumya Basu, David Easley, Maureen O'Hara, Emin Gün Sirer

Link to Paper


Abstract
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We argue that this is due to the absence of a dominant strategy equilibrium in the current fee mechanism. We propose an alternative fee setting mechanism that is inspired by generalized second price auctions. The design of such a mechanism is challenging because miners can use any criteria for including transactions and can manipulate the results of the auction after seeing the proposed fees. Nonetheless, we show that our proposed protocol is free from manipulation as the number of users increases. We further show that, for a large number of users and miners, the gain from manipulation is small for all parties. This results in users proposing fees that represent their true utility and lower variance of revenue for miners. Historical analysis shows that Bitcoin users could have saved $272,528,000 USD in transaction fees while miners could have reduced the variance of fee income by an average factor of 7.4 times.

References
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Bohme, R., N. Christin, B. Edelman, and T. Moore, 2015. Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29, 213-238.
Cong, L., Z. He and J. Li, 2018, Decentralized Mining in Centralized Pools, SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3143724.
Easley, D. and J. Kleinberg, 2010, Networks, Crowds and Markets, Cambridge University Press.
Easley, D., M. O’Hara and S. Basu, 2017, From Mining to Markets: The Evolution of Bitcoin Transactions Fees, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Edelman, B. and M. Schwartz, 2010, Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions, American Economic Review, May 2010, Vol. 100, No. 2: Pages 597-602.
Eyal, I. and E. Sirer, 2014, Majority is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Christin, N., Safavi-Naini, R. (Eds.), Springer Heidelberg, Germany, pp. 436-454.
Gans, J. and H. Halaburda, 2015, Some Economics of Private Digital Currency. In Goldfarb, A., Greenstein, S.M., Tucker, C. E. (Eds.), Economic Analysis of the Digital Economy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, Chapter 9.
Gandel, N. and H. Halaburda, 2016, Can We Predict the Winner in a Market with Network Effects? Competition in cryptocurrency market, Games, 7 (3), 1-21.
Harvey, C., 2016, Cryptofinance, SSSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2438299.
Huberman, G., J. Leshno and C. Moallemi, 2017, Monopoly Without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Pyament System, working paper, Columbia Business School.
Houy, N., 2014, The Bitcoin Mining Game, available at SSRN, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2407834.
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Ma, J., J. Gans and R. Tourky, 2018, Market Structure in Bitcoin Mining, NBER Working Paper No 24242.
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Milgrom, R., The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey, in Social Goal and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner, L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein (eds), Cambridge University Press, 261-289.
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Raskin, M. and D. Yermack, 2018, Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers and the Future of Central Banking. In: Conti-Brown, P., Lastra, R., (Eds.), Research Handbook on Central Banking, Edward Elgar, Publishing, 474-486.
Raskin, M. and D. Yermack, 2017. Corporate Governance and Blockchains. Review of Finance, 21, 7-31.
Rosenfeld, M, 2011, Analysis of Bitcoin Pooled Mining Reward Systems, http://arxiv.org/pdf/1112.4980v1.pdf
Swinkles, J., Efficiency of Large Private Auctions, 2001, Econometrica, 69, 37-68.
Weber, R., 1983, Multi-Object Auctions, in Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting: Uses and Theory, R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik and R. Stark (eds), New York University Press, 165-191.
Yao, A., 2018, An Incentive Analysis of some Bitcoin Fee Designs, arXiv:1811.02351.
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Security of the Blockchain against Long Delay Attack

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/800
Date: 2018-08-31
Author(s): Puwen Wei, Quan Yuan, Yuliang Zheng

Link to Paper


Abstract
The consensus protocol underlying Bitcoin (the blockchain) works remarkably well in practice. However proving its security in a formal setting has been an elusive goal. A recent analytical result by Pass, Seeman and shelat indicates that an idealized blockchain is indeed secure against attacks in an asynchronous network where messages are maliciously delayed by at most Δ≪1/npΔ≪1/np, with nn being the number of miners and pp the mining hardness. This paper improves upon the result by showing that if appropriate inconsistency tolerance is allowed the blockchain can withstand even more powerful external attacks in the honest miner setting. Specifically we prove that the blockchain is secure against long delay attacks with Δ≥1/npΔ≥1/np in an asynchronous network.

References
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  16. Kiayias, A., Panagiotakos, G.: Speed-security tradeoffs in blockchain protocols. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/1019 (2016)
  17. Kiayias, A., Russell, A., David, B., Oliynykov, R.: Ouroboros: A provably secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol. In: Katz, J., Shacham, H. (eds.) CRYPTO 2017. LNCS, vol. 10401, pp. 357–388. Springer, Cham (2017) Security of the Blockchain against Long Delay Attack 23
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  28. Schrijvers, O., Bonneau, J., Boneh, D., Roughgarden, T.: Incentive compatibility of bitcoin mining pool reward functions. In: Grossklags, J., Preneel, B. (eds.) FC 2016. LNCS, vol. 9603, pp. 477–498. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg (2016)
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Merged Mining: Curse or Cure?

Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2017/791
Date: 2017-08-22
Author(s): Aljosha Judmayer, Alexei Zamyatin, Nicholas Stifter, Artemios Voyiatzis, Edgar Weippl

Link to Paper


Abstract
Merged mining refers to the concept of mining more than one cryptocurrency without necessitating additional proof-of-work effort. Although merged mining has been adopted by a number of cryptocurrencies already, to this date little is known about the effects and implications. We shed light on this topic area by performing a comprehensive analysis of merged mining in practice. As part of this analysis, we present a block attribution scheme for mining pools to assist in the evaluation of mining centralization. Our findings disclose that mining pools in merge-mined cryptocurrencies have operated at the edge of, and even beyond, the security guarantees offered by the underlying Nakamoto consensus for extended periods. We discuss the implications and security considerations for these cryptocurrencies and the mining ecosystem as a whole, and link our findings to the intended effects of merged mining.

References
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  12. A. Gervais, G. O. Karame, K. Wust, V. Glykantzis, H. Ritzdorf, and S. Capkun. On the ¨ security and performance of proof of work blockchains. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’16, pages 3–16, New York, NY, USA, 2016. ACM.
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  18. A. Kiayias, A. Russell, B. David, and R. Oliynykov. Ouroboros: A provably secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1c14/549f7ba7d6a000d79a7d12255eb11113e6fa.pdf, 2016. Accessed: 2017-02-20.
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Merged Mining: Analysis of Effects and Implications

Date: 2017-08-24
Author(s): Alexei Zamyatin, Edgar Weippl

Link to Paper


Abstract
Merged mining refers to the concept of mining more than one cryptocurrency without necessitating additional proof-of-work effort. Merged mining was introduced in 2011 as a boostrapping mechanism for new cryptocurrencies and countermeasures against the fragmentation of mining power across competing systems. Although merged mining has already been adopted by a number of cryptocurrencies, to this date little is known about the effects and implications.
In this thesis, we shed light on this topic area by performing a comprehensive analysis of merged mining in practice. As part of this analysis, we present a block attribution scheme for mining pools to assist in the evaluation of mining centralization. Our findings disclose that mining pools in merge-mined cryptocurrencies have operated at the edge of, and even beyond, the security guarantees offered by the underlying Nakamoto consensus for extended periods. We discuss the implications and security considerations for these cryptocurrencies and the mining ecosystem as a whole, and link our findings to the intended effects of merged mining.

Bibliography
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submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

Predicting Block Halving Party Times

arXiv:1708.05185
Date: 2017-08-17
Author(s): Meni Rosenfeld

Link to Paper


Abstract
Bitcoin is the world's first decentralized digital currency. The rate at which bitcoins enter circulation is cut in half every 4 years, approximately. These events are considered landmarks in Bitcoin's history, and as such are widely celebrated. However, this requires placing confidence intervals on the precise timing of the halving well in advance, and the particular mechanism by which the halving time is determined makes this challenging. In this paper, we intend to help party planners by describing the problem, and highlighting several techniques to estimate the mean and variance of the halving.

References
[1] http://bitcoinclock.com/.
[2] www.thehalvening.com/.
[3] http://www.bitcoinblockhalf.com/.
[4] https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide.
[5] Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin p2p virtual currency. http://www.bitcoin.org/.
[6] Meni Rosenfeld. Block [halving] party promo - israel 2016. https://youtu.be/IEcd Ecntro/.
[7] Meni Rosenfeld. Analysis of bitcoin pooled mining reward systems. CoRR, abs/1112.4980, 2011.
[8] Meni Rosenfeld. Analysis of hashrate-based double spending. CoRR, abs/1402.2009, 2014.
submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

myrXiv: Throughout the Years of P2P Consensus Research

2019
01-21 | Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies
01-16 | Topological Analysis of Bitcoin's Lightning Network
01-14 | A Formal Treatment of Hardware Wallets
01-08 | Biased Nonce Sense: Lattice Attacks against Weak ECDSA Signatures in Cryptocurrencies
01-02 | Minimizing Trust in Hardware Wallets with Two Factor Signatures

2018
12-27 | CLoTH: a Simulator for HTLC Payment Networks
12-27 | Analysis of Difficulty Control in Bitcoin and Proof-of-Work Blockchains
12-26 | Bitcoin Payment-channels for Resource Limited IoT Devices
12-17 | Countering Selfish Mining in Blockchains
12-10 | TxProbe: Discovering Bitcoin's Network Topology Using Orphan Transactions
11-22 | Echoes of the Past: Recovering Blockchain Metrics From Merged Mining
11-22 | On Profitability of Trailing Mining
11-11 | An Incentive Analysis of some Bitcoin Fee Designs
11-08 | Deconstructing the Blockchain to Approach Physical Limits
11-01 | A Deep Dive into Blockchain Selfish Mining
10-30 | Boost Blockchain Broadcast Propagation with Tree Routing
10-23 | Predicting the confirmation time of Bitcoin transactions
10-12 | How to Pick Your Friends - A Game Theoretic Approach to P2P Overlay Construction
10-05 | The Proof is in the Pudding: Proofs of Work for Solving Discrete Logarithms
09-27 | Strategies for quantum races
09-22 | Split-Scale: Scaling Bitcoin by Partitioning the UTXO Space
09-05 | Pitchforks in Cryptocurrencies: Enforcing rule changes through offensive forking- and consensus techniques
08-31 | Security of the Blockchain against Long Delay Attack
08-02 | On profitability of stubborn mining
07-09 | Personalized Difficulty Adjustment for Countering the Double-Spending Attack in Proof-of-Work Consensus Protocols
06-10 | Compact Multi-Signatures for Smaller Blockchains
05-29 | Flux: Revisiting Near Blocks for Proof-of-Work Blockchains
05-28 | Dandelion++: Lightweight Cryptocurrency Networking with Formal Anonymity Guarantees
05-01 | Agreement with Satoshi – On the Formalization of Nakamoto Consensus
03-29 | Rethinking Large-Scale Consensus

2017
12-29 | Evolutionary Game for Mining Pool Selection in Blockchain Networks
10-19 | Bobtail: A Proof-of-Work Target that Minimizes Blockchain Mining Variance
09-02 | Proposal for a fully decentralized blockchain and proof-of-work algorithm for solving NP-complete problems
08-24 | Merged Mining: Analysis of Effects and Implications
08-22 | Merged Mining: Curse or Cure?
08-17 | Predicting Block Halving Party Times
07-01 | Estimation of Miner Hash Rates and Consensus on Blockchains
05-05 | FruitChains: A Fair Blockchain
03-24 | Hijacking Bitcoin: Routing Attacks on Cryptocurrencies
02-17 | Double spend races
02-17 | Satoshi Risk Tables
01-15 | An Explanation of Nakamoto's Analysis of Double-spend Attacks

2016
11-20 | An Analysis of Attacks on Blockchain Consensus
05-31 | Bitcoin's Security Model Revisited

2015
11-11 | Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol

2014
02-09 | Analysis of Hashrate-Based Double Spending

2011
12-21 | Analysis of Bitcoin Pooled Mining Reward Systems

2008
10-31 | Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
02-06 | Distributed Double Spending Prevention
submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Cash Mining Pools to Implement Infrastructure Fund: 12.5% of BCH Coinbase Rewards

Bitcoin Cash Mining Pools to Implement Infrastructure Fund: 12.5% of BCH Coinbase Rewards submitted by afriendofsatoshi to btc [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Cash Mining Pools to Implement Infrastructure Fund: 12.5% of BCH Coinbase Rewards

Bitcoin Cash Mining Pools to Implement Infrastructure Fund: 12.5% of BCH Coinbase Rewards submitted by afriendofsatoshi to Bitcoincash [link] [comments]

Bitcoin.com Mining Pool: 105% Block Reward and 0% Fees

Bitcoin.com Mining Pool: 105% Block Reward and 0% Fees submitted by Egon_1 to btc [link] [comments]

How and why can Bitcoin.com's mining pool pay "110%" block rewards?

Am I missing something or is the only conclusion one can draw that they are just overcharging for the mining power and then paying out bigger rewards from this reserve they are creating up front... otherwise, how could it possibly work?
submitted by arganam to btc [link] [comments]

@gpuhot: RT @bitcoin_v: Some say BitcoinV is an experiment. BitcoinV is a new approach to PoW mining and it will either catch on today, in the future, or fade away. If enough pools can form to mine large block rewards, the supply will increase and draw more people in.

submitted by AltCash to altcash [link] [comments]

@gpuhot: $BTCV is adjusted up to x32, 1600 BTCV/block at https://t.co/gOYoiWZJ8l mining pool! Mining BitcoinV with variable block rewards! sha256 -o stratum+tcp://stratum.altcoincash.xyz:33331 -u -p c=BTCV #altcoins #mining #crypto #bitcoin #btcv #bitcoinv @bitcoin_v https://t.co/LpncubVFY9

submitted by AltCash to altcash [link] [comments]

@gpuhot: A few hours without block makes patient impatient... Adjusted rewards down to 1024x, 51200 BTCV/block. Jump on and mine some @bitcoin_v now! -a sha256 -o stratum+tcp://stratum.altcoincash.xyz:33331 -u -p c=BTCV pool discord: https://t.co/PX83EMBgsf

submitted by AltCash to altcash [link] [comments]

@gpuhot: $BTCV is adjusted up to x16, 800 BTCV/block at https://t.co/gOYoiWZJ8l mining pool! Mining BitcoinV with variable block rewards! sha256 -o stratum+tcp://stratum.altcoincash.xyz:33331 -u -p c=BTCV #altcoins #mining #crypto #bitcoin #btcv #bitcoinv @bitcoin_v https://t.co/TdmidJCsHG

submitted by AltCash to altcash [link] [comments]

Bitcoin.com Mining Pool left private beta and opened up to the public (110% block reward, 0% fees)

Bitcoin.com Mining Pool left private beta and opened up to the public (110% block reward, 0% fees) submitted by zowki to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin mining pool with proportional reward

If you are looking for a different pool to join (or just new to mining) please consider joining the Golden Nonce Pool (https://www.goldennoncepool.com).
submitted by iruleonu to bitcoinminingpools [link] [comments]

Are there any mining pools that rewards the person who finds the block/hash? /r/Bitcoin

Are there any mining pools that rewards the person who finds the block/hash? /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Does anyone know what kinda pool reward this is? Thanks so much! (current block reward * no. of mined blocks+tx fees) * hashrate in GH/s * 10^9 / 2^32 * 86,400 / no. of mined blocks before difficulty change * previous difficulty + (no. of mined blocks after difficulty change * next d /r/Bitcoin

Does anyone know what kinda pool reward this is? Thanks so much! (current block reward * no. of mined blocks+tx fees) * hashrate in GH/s * 10^9 / 2^32 * 86,400 / no. of mined blocks before difficulty change * previous difficulty + (no. of mined blocks after difficulty change * next d /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

How and why can Bitcoin.com's mining pool pay "110%" block rewards? /r/btc

How and why can Bitcoin.com's mining pool pay submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Top 4 Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Structures

Top 4 Bitcoin Mining Pool Reward Structures submitted by CryptoCurrencyNews to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

BU Team: Why don't you incentivise the mining pool with quarter or half or one full bitcoin reward for mining BU from your hoardings or hodlings ??

If you have better ideas for BU to expand and get 51% consensus then please list them here.
submitted by unconfirmedbtc to btc [link] [comments]

1 Bitcoin In Day 4 WebSite mining Automatically - YouTube I found my first block Bitcoin mining today with Kano's ... How to start BitCoin Pool Mining on OS X BITCOIN: SOLO MINING VS MINING POOL! Bitcoin price analysis!- bitcoin may 29 HDAC ICO Mining and Reward System

arXiv:1112.4980v1 [cs.DC] 21 Dec 2011 Analysis of Bitcoin Pooled Mining Reward Systems Meni Rosenfeld December 22, 2011 The Bitcoin.com mining pool has the lowest share reject rate (0.15%) we've ever seen. Other pools have over 0.30% rejected shares. Furthermore, the Bitcoin.com pool has a super responsive and reliable support team. Currently, every Bitcoin block has a 12.5 BTC reward which Antpool does share with you when it finds a block. Lately, however, Bitcoin transaction fees have been rising and an additional 1-2 bitcoins are collected per block by pools. At this time, Antpool keeps 1-2 bitcoins form transaction fees for itself, which are not shared with miners who have hash power pointed toward the pool. It can be ... Pooled mining is a mining approach where multiple generating clients contribute to the generation of a block, and then split the block reward according the contributed processing power. Bitcoin pooled mining effectively reduces the granularity of the block generation reward. This reward is collected by each transaction done on the blockchain (the fee you have to pay when making a transaction). With Full Pay-Per-Share, the pool will also pay the transaction fee rewards to the miners. For example, the Bitcoin block at depth 603308 had a fee reward of 0.49475167 BTC + 12.5 BTC block reward.

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1 Bitcoin In Day 4 WebSite mining Automatically - YouTube

Today, I'm going to show you how to start pooled mining in Mac OS X. Links to websites mentioned in this video: The Software: https://bitcointalk.org/index.p... Best bitcoin mining site are a way for Bitcoin miners to pool their resources together and share their hashing power while splitting the reward equally according to the amount of shares they ... Who Pays the Bitcoin Mining Reward? - George Levy - Duration: 4:13. George Levy 12,968 views. 4:13. Bitcoin's Halving in 2020 - Will It Spark the Next Bitcoin Bull Run? 1) If you enjoyed this, I'd welcome a tip here: 185By4a1Lt2HnKLAKR5EmidZMYgp5DDSaj 2) Mining Pool Reward Methods, lecture by: Meni Rosenfeld of Bitcoil.co.il... Coinbase Wallet: https://www.coinbase.com/join/5a87ecac52a16c066e6760c3 Blockchain wallet: https://blockchain.info/fr/wallet/#/login Coinpaiments Wallet: htt...

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